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Abstract
Background: In some countries every citizen has the right to obtain a designated general practitioner. However,
each individual may have preferences that cannot be fulfilled due to shortages of some kind. The questions raised in
this paper are: To what extent can we expect that preferences are fulfilled when the patients “compete” for entry on
the lists of practitioners? What changes can we expect under changing conditions? A particular issue explored in the
paper is when the majority of women prefer a female doctor and there is a shortage of female doctors.
Findings: The analysis is done on the macro level by the so called gravity model and on the micro level by recent
theories of benefit efficient population behaviour, partly developed by two of the authors. A major finding is that
the number of patients wanting a doctor of the underrepresented gender is less important than the strength of
their preferences as determining factor for the benefit efficient allocation.
Conclusions: We were able to generate valuable insights to the questions asked and to the dynamics of benefit
efficient allocations. The approach is quite general and can be applied in a variety of contexts.
Background
In some countries every citizen has the right to obtain a
designated general practitioner. This is so in Norway,
where a scheme, “fastlegeordningen”, was initiated by law
in 1999, see [1]. The scheme was implemented through-
out the country by 2001, and some details on how
it works may be found in Grytten and Sørensen [2].
Currently more than 99% of the population participate in
the scheme. However, each individual may have prefer-
ences that cannot be fulfilled due to shortages of some
kind. One example is the preference for having a general
practitioner of the same gender, of the opposite gender,
or be indifferent. It has been advocated that female
patients have a stronger preference for doctor of the
same gender than male patients. When female doctors
are less frequent than male doctors, everybody cannot
get a doctor according to their preference, unless there
are unacceptable loads and unacceptable vacancies. To
what extent can we expect that such preferences are
fulfilled when the patients “compete” for entry on the
lists? What changes in the distribution can we expect
under changing conditions? In particular, in the case of
many women with strong preference for a female doctor,
how will the fraction of female patients assigned to
female doctors expect to change when the fraction of
available female doctors increases.
In Norway about 10% of the participants in the
scheme change their general practitioner each year for
some reason or other. We have no ambitions to describe
individual actions at the micro level, e.g. how a patient
having a doctor of the “wrong sex” initiates the search
and may find a doctor of the “correct sex”. A change
will typically take place only at a vacancy at a doctor in
the neighbourhood, and this varies not only between
urban and rural areas, but also within certain regions.
Initial assignment and decrement also complicates the
matter, and it is probably futile to model a dynamic
allocation process. A number of assumptions have to be
made, that may be disputed and hard to verify empiri-
cally. Do we have alternatives that may provide insight
to the dynamics and limitations of such a system?
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Methods
On the macro level it is well known that behaviour in
many populations, among plants, animals and humans
have cost minimizing traits. For humans this was formu-
lated by Zipf [3]. Smith [4] gave a formal statement of
the Zipf principle, saying that patterns with lower total
costs are at least as likely as those with higher costs. On
this basis Erlander and Smith [5] developed a general
theory of efficient population behaviour, leading to a
representation theorem for the feasible patterns. Among
several special cases of this theory are situations leading
to the so-called gravity model. Gravity type models are
well known within in the urban geography literature as
models for localization and interaction. The traces go
back to Reilly [6] who studied retail relationships. More
recent contributions to this theory are given by Jørnsten
et.al [7]. Gravity models turned out to be quite robust
under varied circumstances, and found applications in
many fields, among them studies on travelling patterns
and distribution of commodities in a network, both
locally and in international trade. For early reviews on
gravity and potential models for human interaction, see
Carrothers [8] and Haynes and Fotheringham [9]. The
gravity model has also found applications within health
care, either from the point of view of needs (regardless of
willingness to pay) or demand, see Connor et. al. [10].
Studies with a spatial dimension have either focused on
potential availability or revealed availability in an area,
see Shannon and Dever [11] and Gesler [12].
Our problem of distribution of patients among doctors
may be formulated within the gravity model as well. The
model has its limitations, and is not flexible enough to
pick up interesting problems on the micro level.
However, recent work by Jørnsten and Ubøe [13] has
provided opportunities for including more characteris-
tics and restrictions of different nature. This is required
if we think of using such models for planning purposes
at the micro level.
This paper contains what we believe is new material
to statisticians and health professionals, with respect to
modelling opportunities and qualitative results. The
paper is in two parts, the first is on macro modelling
based on the simple gravity model, and the second is on
micro modelling based on recent theory reported in
Ubøe and Lillestøl [14]. These models have intrinsic fea-
tures that are not transparent from the general theoreti-
cally derived formulas, and the purpose of the paper is
to bring forward some interesting dynamic aspects of
the models. This is done by numerical calculations, with
algorithms implemented in Excel and in Matlab.
Although the problem came out of the Norwegian
patient list system, the modelling approach and qualita-
tive results have general applicability.
The gravity model
We first explain the general idea of a gravity model by
an example from another context, after which we
explain the analogy to the patient list problem. Consider
the travelling between residence and work, constituting
the nodes in a network, where the distances between
the nodes are given. The distances will influence the
preferences for the locations, and therefore the travelling
patterns between the nodes. Formalizing this we have a
set I of “departure nodes” and a set J of “arrival nodes”
and a distance function d(i,j) defined for all pairs (i,j) in
I × J. The gravity model then writes the probability of
“travelling” from i to j as
P(i, j) = ai · bj · e−c d(i,j)
where c is a coefficient expressing the sensitivity to dis-
tance. Sufficient assumptions on the marginals of P(i,j) lead
to a unique solution of the gravity equation in terms of the
coefficients ai and bj. These coefficients may be calculated
by an easily programmed and fast converging iterative pro-
cess. In practice the restrictions may be derived from
observed travelling patterns. In the general theory it is
more convenient to talk in terms of costs rather than dis-
tance, and the theory allows different types of costs (in the
wide sense), e.g. direct travelling cost and travelling time.
The only difference is that this requires two constant terms
in the exponent, each with a c-coefficient.
Early on this was just an attractive model to represent
data, and criticized by economists for its lack of founda-
tion in economic theory. Later it turned out that assump-
tions on “efficient population behaviour” lead to the
conclusion that the travelling probabilities could be
expressed this way. The expression can be obtained
under different assumptions both within the classical uti-
lity paradigm of individual behaviour and by various
probabilistic theories of choice behaviour, among them
maximum entropy considerations. The classical microe-
conomic paradigm of utility-maximization subject to
appropriate budget constraints is based on strong
assumptions on individual choice behaviour, while the
probabilistic theories may be based on weaker assump-
tions, see Sen and Smith [15] for a survey and references
to an extensive literature on the topic. We limit ourselves
to state that a possible behavioural interpretation is that
the formula represents the maximal independent interac-
tions possible under the restrictions of the system.
The analogy to the above for the match of doctors to
patients, is that we have four types of patients, males
and females preferring doctor of the same sex or not,
i.e. four “departure nodes”, while we have two “arrival
nodes”, male and female doctors. Formally we can write
I = {ff, fm, mf, mm}, where the first letter is the gender
of the patient and the second letter is the preference for
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gender of doctor. Furthermore J = {F, M} with letters
representing the gender of the assigned doctor. The ana-
logy to distance is the felt nuisance of being assigned
contrary to preference. As distance function one may
simply use d(i,j) = 0 or 1 according to whether the sec-
ond letter in the “departure node” corresponds to or
deviates from “the arrival node” j, for example d(mf,F) =
0 while d(mf,M) = 1. We have then implicitly assumed
that the nuisance of having a doctor of “unwanted sex”
is the same for men as well as for women. By setting d
(ff,M) = 2 rather than 1, we have expressed that the
women feel this nuisance stronger than men. However,
this raises the question about realistic specification of
the differences and the strengths of the preferences.
Our gravity model has two main application opportu-
nities:
- gain insight to the dynamics of change under chan-
ging conditions
- establish current preferences by estimating the
model parameters from data
This paper considers the former opportunity, by com-
putational examples covering a sufficient parameter
range to draw general qualitative conclusions not appar-
ent from the gravity formula itself. We may then make
comparisons under different assumptions and study
what is most likely to affect changes in observed pattern,
e.g. how the fraction of females assigned to female doc-
tors changes as the fraction of female doctors increases,
which is the expected scenario in many countries in the
years to come. The qualitative results obtained, were
partly a surprise to the medical professionals involved in
the project, and initiated some rethinking. The second
opportunity is clearly also of interest. It turns out that a
given allocation does not uniquely determine the dis-
tance structure, i.e. different preference structures may
lead to the same allocation. This identifiability issue
requires additional theory, and is the theme in Ubøe
and Lillestøl [16], where available Norwegian data is
used for illustration. We briefly return to this aspect in
the closing section of the paper.
Results
Macro analysis: The gravity model
Throughout our analysis we assume a population with
equal number of male and female patients. In order to
expose the effects of potentially different preference
structures for female and male patients, we start with a
situation where 70% of the female patients would like a
female doctor the most, if available, while 30% of them
would like a male doctor the most. Among the male
patients we assume an even distribution of 50% for male
doctor and 50% for female doctor. In the gravity model
we specify the “distance” equal to 0 for allocations in
concordance with the preferences and “distance” equal
to 1 for discordance between preference and allocation.
We will then change the percentages and the distances
so that their effects become clearly exposed. For this
purpose we keep the even distribution of preferences
among the males fixed. Even if we say that a certain
fraction of patients would like to have doctor of a cer-
tain gender, the degree of nuisance by contrary alloca-
tion varies, both among the sexes and absolutely.
Possible larger nuisance among the females than males,
of having a doctor of the opposite gender contrary to
preference, may be adjusted by enlarging the distance
for this female group. The strength of nuisance in gen-
eral may be adjusted by a suitable weighting of the dis-
tance structure, i.e. by the factor c in the gravity
formula.
First we will look at how the fractions of females vary
among doctors of each gender for increasing fraction of
female doctors. They are given in Table 1 for preference
strength c = 1.
We see that when the fraction of female doctors
increases, doctors of both gender will have a smaller
fraction of female patients. With few female doctors, the
fraction of female patients among them will be approxi-
mately 56%, and only decrease slowly until there is a
more even number of doctors of the two genders, there-
after the fraction of female patients decreases more
rapidly towards 50% of female patients among them.
With few female doctors we see that the fraction of
female patients among the male doctors is slightly
below 50% and have a similar decreasing pattern. We
also see that if the fractions of female and male doctors
are equal, the fraction of female patients among the
female and male doctors will be 54.6% and 45.4%
respectively.
Figure 1 shows for moderate weights (c = 1) the frac-
tion of female patients among female and male doctors
respectively as function of the fraction of female doctors
in three situations, respectively where 60%, 70% and
80% of the female patients prefer female doctors and
Table 1 Fraction of female patients among female and
male doctors
Fraction
F-doctors
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Fraction f
among F
0.564 0.561 0.557 0.552 0.546 0.538 0.529 0.519 0.509
Fraction f
among
M
0.493 0.485 0.476 0.465 0.454 0.443 0.433 0.424 0.416
Fraction of female patients among female and male doctors for different
fractions of available female doctors. The case of preference for female
doctors 70% among female patients and 50% among male patients and
preference strength c = 1.
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male patient preferences in all three situations are
50-50. The upper bundle of curves is for female doctors,
and the lower bundle is for male doctors. In both
bundles of curves the middle one corresponds to the
numbers in Table 1. We see that all curves are monoto-
nically decreasing, and that the decrease is slow until
the fraction of female doctors is slightly above 50%,
thereafter the decrease is more pronounced.
Similar computations for median/heavy weights (c = 2)
for the same distance structure give a graph with the
two bundles of curves further apart, but the difference is
surprisingly small. Heavier preference weights (c = 3)
gives results that do not deviate much from c = 2, and
less so for small fraction of female doctors, where the
fraction of female patients among female doctors is just
increased from 56% to 58%, and eventually starts to
decrease more rapidly above 50% female doctors. It may
come as a surprise that the changes towards a larger
fraction of female patients among female doctors are
moderate as the preference strength increases. This may
be interpreted as “limits to change” in a system where
the felt nuisance for mismatch is the same for both gen-
der, even if there is a strong majority of females feeling
nuisance of a mismatch. However, if we change the pre-
ference structure itself, we may obtain large differences.
We will return to this later.
Before turning to our next question, we note that the
fractions considered above are tied together by a simple
formula: Let FF and FM be the fraction of female
patients on the list of female and male doctors respec-
tively, and let h be the fraction of female doctors. The
specification of h, c (weight) and d (distance) deter-
mines FF and FM, and implicitly the corresponding
fraction of male patients among the female and male
doctors respectively as 1-FF and 1-FM. However, FF
and FM are also tied together. In a population of
equally many female and male patients we have that
h∙FF + (1-h)∙FM = 1/2, and so FM = (1/2 - h ∙ FF)/(1-h).
Next we will look at the fraction of patients not allo-
cated according to preferences. For short, we name
these patients mismatched. We may study the fraction
of mismatched patients among each gender of doctors
and the fraction of mismatched patients of each gender
of patients as function of the fraction of female doctors.
Computations using the gravity model for preference
strength c = 1 gave the results in Table 2 and are illu-
strated in Figure 2 and 3.
We see that the fraction of total mismatched is decreas-
ing as the fraction of female doctors increases up to
about the level where they are capable to accommodate
the majority of female patients preferring a female doc-
tor. Then the fraction of mismatched is increasing, since
from then on more men are mismatched. A similar pat-
tern is seen for both the female and male patients sepa-
rately, except for the fact that the reversal for the males
occurs at about 50%, as expected. Furthermore we see
that the fraction mismatched at doctors of a given gen-
der starts out low for the female doctors when they are
few, and increases throughout as they become more
abundant, ending with the situation where many of their
patients are mismatched males. For male doctors the
pattern is the opposite, starting out with a majority of
Figure 1 Fraction of female patients. Fraction of female patients as function of the fraction of female doctors, taken among female doctors
(upper curves) and male doctors (lower curves), for 60% (dotted line), 70% (dashed line), 80% (solid line) of female patients preferring female
doctors, and 50%-50% male preferences, all with preference strength c = 1.
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male doctors with a large share of mismatched female
patients, and ending up with few male doctors with
mostly patients according to their preference.
Our calculations on macro level are based on the
assumption that the patient lists of all doctors are filled
up, which means that adjustments to increase the total
satisfaction at the micro level can be achieved by
exchanging patients only. Some doctors will in practice
of course have vacancies on their lists, and will be able
to accept new patients according to their stated prefer-
ence. It is not obvious how this should be implemented
in the model. One possibility is to define a fifth fictitious
patient category, representing an empty list position.
If we are indifferent whether this happens to a male or
a female doctor, we can represent this with a zero in the
distance function. We have performed calculations
according to this and with different fractions for total
vacancy regardless of gender, and it turned out that the
distribution of patient gender on the lists of both male
and female doctors changed surprisingly little. However,
the under-represented gender of doctors, in view of the
preferences, will of course experience less vacancy on
their lists. Figure 4 shows the fraction of vacancies for
doctors of each gender for 10% and 20% total vacancy
respectively for the situation above, where 70% of the
female patients want a female doctor, and the male
patients were distributed even.
If the take the situation with 30% female doctors and
10% total vacancy we have 7.6% vacancy among the
female doctors and 11.0% vacancy among the male.
With total vacancy of 20%, the numbers are respectively
15.8% and 21.8%. Not surprisingly, the fraction of vacan-
cies for the two genders of doctors will be even when
the fraction of female doctors is increased to about 70%,
the fraction that matches preference among the female
patients. When there is a lack of female doctors and the
males get the larger fraction of vacancies, it may be of
interest to introduce some regulatory measures so that
the vacancies of both genders are about the same. In
our model we may change the “distance” between the
categories “empty list position” and female doctor from
zero to a positive number. The magnitude of this num-
ber may be of interest to the regulators when balancing
off conflicting objectives.
With vacancies, the quantities are tied together as fol-
lows: Let t be the fraction of total vacancies, and TF and
TM be the fraction of empty list positions among female
and male doctors respectively. Let as before h be the
fraction of female doctors, and FF and FM be the frac-
tion of female patients among female and male doctors
respectively, but now taken to be among the non-vacant
entries. The specification of t, h, c and d determines TF,
TM, FF and FM, and implicitly the corresponding frac-
tions of male patients among the female and male
Table 2 Fraction of mismatched patients
Fraction F-doctors 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Mismatched Total 0.519 0.443 0.376 0.320 0.281 0.262 0.266 0.293 0.339
Mismatched f-patients 0.601 0.508 0.423 0.349 0.290 0.251 0.234 0.239 0.263
Mismatched m-patients 0.436 0.378 0.329 0.292 0.271 0.272 0.298 0.347 0.416
Mismatched at F-doctor 0.094 0.108 0.127 0.150 0.181 0.218 0.261 0.308 0.355
Mismatched at M-doctor 0.566 0.527 0.483 0.433 0.381 0.327 0.277 0.233 0.197
Fraction of mismatched patients among each gender of patients and the fraction of mismatched patients at each gender of doctors for different fractions of
available female doctors. The case of preference for female doctors 70% among female patients and 50% among male patients and preference strength c = 1.
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Figure 2 Fraction mismatched patients as function of fraction
female doctors. Fraction mismatched patients as function of
fraction female doctors in case of 70% of female patients preferring
a female doctor and 50%-50% male patient preferences, (preference
strength c = 1).
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Figure 3 Fraction mismatched at female and male doctors.
Fraction mismatched at female and male doctors in case of 70% of
female patients preferring a female doctor and 50%-50% male
patient preferences, (preference strength c = 1).
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doctors as 1-FF and 1-FM respectively. TF, TM, FF
and FM are, however, linked together since we in a
population of equal number of men and women have
that h∙(1-TF) ∙ FF + (1-h)∙(1-TM) ∙ FM = ½∙(1-t). Given
three of the quantities with capital letters, the forth is
determined as well.
In the examples above we have assumed that more
women (70%) than men (50%) feel some nuisance with
a doctor of the opposite sex, while the felt nuisance is
about equal for both genders. We have seen that this
difference between the genders does not put appreciable
pressure towards skew distribution of patient gender for
the doctors. Only when this nuisance is felt stronger
among women than men can we expect larger changes.
If we again take the situation above, where 70% of the
female patients will prefer a female doctor, and the male
patients were distributed evenly, and where, as before,
d(mm, F) = 1, but d(ff,M) = 1, 2, and 3 respectively, we
get the results of Table 3 for the cases of 0%, 10% and
20% total vacancy and 30% female doctors (note that
the fractions are with respect to the non-vacant entries)
We see how the increased relative preference strength
between females and males forces the fraction of
females among female doctors to increase, while it is
reduced among the males. If we look at the case of 20%
vacancies in the rightmost column of the table, we have
77.2% female patients among female doctors, and 36.2%
female patients among male doctors. In both groups
there are some who have fulfilled their primary wish,
and some not, and the table also provides the fraction
mismatched females patients under the varying circum-
stances. We have to increase the relative preference
strength considerably in order for the fraction of females
at female doctors to approach 100%. In fact, a raise of
relative preference strength from 3 to 10 will give 97.6%
females at female doctors, and just 0.4% misplaced
female patients, everything else kept constant.
Micro analysis: The extended gravity model
In the examples above we have studied the problem at
the macro level, with a large and undefined number of
patients and doctors, where the focus quantity is frac-
tions. We have limited ourselves to situations with suffi-
cient capacity to cover the demand for a doctor of some
gender. In reality a limited number of doctors are avail-
able in the neighbourhood. Some of them may be fully
booked, and we can imagine situations with waiting
lists. We may also have additional characteristics separ-
ating both the patients and the doctors. Recent theory
based on the idea of “efficient behaviour” offers an
opportunity to analyze various situations on the micro
level, see Jørnsten and Ubøe [13] for the general theory
and Ubøe and Lillestøl [14] for theory in the current
context. Here an extended gravity formula is derived
under the assumption of “efficient system behaviour”,
assuming that for two allocations, the one with the
highest total utility is more probable. See the appendix
for the derived expression.
We will here give some general qualitative results
coming out of the extended gravity formula, which is
not transparent from the formula itself. Here we will
mainly focus on the effect of differences and changes in
the utility structure. As before we look at the four
patient categories mm, mf, fm, ff, where the first letter
denotes the gender of the patient and the second letter
denotes the patient’s preference for gender of doctor.
Suppose that the categories mm and ff have moderate
preferences for a doctor of the same gender, while fm
Figure 4 Fraction of vacancies among doctors of each gender.
Fraction of vacancies among female doctors (dashed curves) and
male doctors (solid curves) for total vacancy of 10% (lower curves)
and 20% (upper curves) as function of the fraction of female doctors.
Table 3 Fraction of female patients and vacancies for doctors of each gender
Fraction of vacancies 0% 10% 20%
Relative preference strength 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
F-doctors: Fraction f-patients 0.557 0.684 0.794 0.557 0.679 0.782 0.556 0.675 0.772
F-doctors: Fraction vacant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.048 0.031 0.130 0.094 0.064
M-doctors: Fraction f-patients 0.476 0.421 0.374 0.475 0.418 0.435 0.474 0.415 0.362
M-doctors: Fraction vacant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.109 0.117 0.182 0.198 0.211
Fraction mismatched f-patients 0.422 0.325 0.245 0.417 0.312 0.223 0.412 0.301 0.207
Fraction of female patients and vacancies for doctors of each gender for 0%, 10% and 20% total vacancy for increasing nuisance of misplaced females, i.e. d(ff,
M) = 1, 2, 3. The case of preference for female doctors 70% among female patients and 50% among male patients.
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and mf feel some, but not particularly strong nuisance
by a doctor of the opposite gender. However, all cate-
gories feel a stronger nuisance by not being on the
patient list of any doctor, i.e. being on a waiting list. For
a start we assume that doctors are not penalized by not
having their patient lists filled up. It is now more conve-
nient to express the preferences in terms of “utility” (the
negative of distance), taking both positive and negative
values. A possible representation of the described situa-
tion by utility numbers is given in Table 4.
We will here consider situations with different number of
available doctors of each gender. Assume first, to keep
things simple, that all doctors have the same list length,
and that we have the same number of patients in each of
the four categories. The main findings are as follows: In
the case of a deficit of doctors, the expected number of
patients in each of the four patient categories will differ
between male and female doctors, but be the same for all
doctors of the same gender. However, the expected num-
ber and the distribution of patient categories on the wait-
ing list will be the same for all doctors irrespective of
gender. If we let the list lengths vary among doctors, but
in a way so that the total numbers of patient entries are
the same as above within each gender, it turns out that
the fractions in each of the four patient categories are
unchanged, while the number and distribution on the
waiting list are unchanged. The relative distribution
among the four patient categories on the patient list is
therefore common for doctors of the same gender, so
that the expected number is given by multiplication of
the list length. Consider, as before, a situation with equal
number of patients in each of the four patient groups,
but so few that there is a deficit of patients. Now it turns
out that all doctors of the same gender have the same
share of vacancy on their lists, but different between the
genders. Let us look at some specific examples, which
exhibit some findings of general nature:
Example
Given a population of 16 000 persons in an area served
by 7 doctors, 4 male and 3 female, all with list lengths
2000, represented by the following vector with female
numbers slanted (2000,2000,2000,2000,2000,2000,2000).
With 4000 patients in each of the four patient cate-
gories, the expected distributions of the 16 000 patients
on the 14 000 patient entries or the waiting lists
are given in Table 5, for each of the male and female
doctors (table sums deviating from the marginals are
due to rounding errors):
If we introduce varying list lengths (1000,2000,2000,
3000,1000,2000,3000), i.e. the total number of entries for
male and female doctors are as above, the number of
patients for doctor 2, 3 and 6 are unchanged, while doctor
1 and 5 have cut their number of patients in half, and doc-
tor 3 and 7 get their numbers multiplied by the factor 1.5.
The waiting list numbers are the same for all seven
doctors.
Now suppose we have 12 000 patients served by the 7
doctors, having 14 000 entries, but with varying list
lengths as above, so that we have 14.3% total vacancy.
Again assuming equal number of patients in the four
categories, this time 3000, the model gives the allocation
in Table 6, where we have lumped together the four
waiting list groups, since they are all empty.
We see that all male doctors have 14.9% expected
vacancy, while the female doctors have 13.5% expected
vacancy.
We are now ready to study what happens when the pre-
ferences are changed. First, if we change all disutilities
by being on the waiting list from -2 to -3 (or even -5),
there will be no change in the table, telling that the sig-
nal is picked up already at -2 for the case of plenty of
vacancies and no loss for vacancy. If we introduce a loss
for the doctor in case of vacancy, e.g. replace 0 by -1,
we also get the same result as above. To create a differ-
ence, we must have a difference between genders with
respect to felt loss. If the female doctors feel this stron-
ger than the male doctors, they will have less vacancies.
Some of this is of course fairly obvious, but shows that
the model gives meaningful results throughout. For
instance, if we change the losses from -1 to -2 for the
female doctors, the expected vacancies among female
doctors are reduced to 7.6%, while they among the male
doctors are increased to 19.3.%. By taking -5 instead, the
vacancies are changed to about 0.6% for female doctors
and 24.6% for male doctors. One may ponder on the
kind of administrative means required for such a trans-
fer of welfare.
An interesting question is whether there are prefer-
ence structures, where some doctors have vacancy,
while there is a lack of doctors in the system as a whole.
There are! One example is when the ff-group prefers to
be on the waiting list of a female doctor, instead of
being assigned to a male doctor.
Table 4 Utility numbers for assignments
Group mm-p mf-p Fm-p ff-p mm-w mf-w fm-w ff-w Vacancy
M-doctor 1 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 0
F-doctor -1 0 0 1 -2 -2 -2 -2 0
Utility numbers for assignments to doctor (as patient/waiting list) and vacancy.
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In the discussion and examples for the micro-model,
we have assumed an equal number of patients in the
four patient categories. In our main macro-example of
the preceding section we had 70% of the female patients
favouring a doctor of the same gender, but 50% of the
males. However, both models are general and accommo-
date any configuration. We can also extend the macro-
model to include waiting lists.
In order to compare the results from the micro-
model above with the macro-model, we may put heavy
disutilities on waiting, so that this is ruled out. We will
here consider cases where the number of entries
exactly matches the number of patients, and put heavy
disutility to wipe out vacancy as well. Consider there-
fore 14 000 patients to be assigned to 7 doctors, each
with 2000 available entries totalling 14 000, and where
3 out of 7 doctors are female i.e. 42.8%. Assume first
the same utilities for both gender, as we did for the
macro-model (there measured by “distance”), and take
the case of 70% of the female patients favouring a doc-
tor of the same gender and 50% of the males. The dis-
tribution of the four categories (mm, mf, fm, ff) is
(3500, 3500, 2100, 4900), and we take utilities -2 on
waiting list and -2 for vacancy. We obtain the results
given in Table 7.
By changing the disutility for waiting and vacancy from
-2 to -4 there will be none waiting and no vacancies.
This gives the fraction of female patients assigned to
male doctors 46.2% and to female doctors 55.1%,
which is close to the numbers obtained for the macro-
model.
On the other hand, if we consider the situation of
stronger affection among the females mentioned above,
we may specify the utilities as in Table 8.
The results for the micro-model and the macro-model
coincides, and the computation gave the results in
Table 9, for some group fractions of females preferring
female doctors.
At this point we are reminded that we can obtain major
differences for the macro-model as well. It all depends
on differences in the preference structure of the genders,
and not so much on the number in each category and
the absolute preference strength. In order to illustrate
the sensitivity to change we take a macro example (with
no vacancies and no waiting list), with equal number of
patients in the four patient categories and utility struc-
ture as in Table 10.
In Figure 5 we plot, as function of x of Table 10, the
fraction of female patients among female doctors (top
three curves) and among male doctors (bottom three
curves) for three fractions of female doctors 20%, 30%
and 40% (in this order from top). Equal preferences cor-
respond to x = 1, and the most relevant part of the
curves is to the right of this. We see that the disparity
of utility affects the female doctors more than the male
doctors in this region, and that there is not much
change beyond x = 3.
Discussion
The theory and examples above aimed at giving some
insights to qualitative dynamic issues, e.g. what affects
the level and changes of allocations in a system compet-
ing for resources. We have tried to do this by means of
models representing benefit efficient behaviour, and ana-
lyzing the issue related to a specific context, that of
patients having preferences for the gender of their
Table 5 Expected distribution of patients on patient list
and waiting list
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p mm-w mf-w fm-w ff-w Vac.
M-doctor 835 509 509 147 51 84 84 67 1
F-doctor 102 458 458 981 51 84 84 67 1
Expected distribution of patients on patient list and waiting list for doctors of
each gender (Doctors: 4 male, 3 female, Patients: 16 000, Patient entries: 14
000, equal list length of 2000).
Table 6 Expected distribution of patients and vacancies
(varying list length)
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p Waiting Vacancy
M-doctor 1 (1000) 343 223 223 62 0 149
M-doctor 2 (2000) 686 446 446 124 0 298
M-doctor 3 (2000) 686 446 446 124 0 298
M-doctor 4 (3000) 1029 669 669 186 0 447
F-doctor 1 (1000) 42 203 203 417 0 135
F-doctor 2 (2000) 84 405 405 834 0 271
F-doctor 3 (3000) 127 608 608 1251 0 406
Expected distribution of patients and vacancies for each of 7 doctors with
varying list lengths (Patients: 12 000, Patient entries: 14 000, varying list
length in parenthesis).
Table 7 Expected distribution of patients (macro example
comparison)
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p Waiting vacancy
M-doctors 725 348 435 487 5 5
F-doctors 198 700 119 980 5 4
Expected distribution of patients for each of 7 doctors with equal list lengths
2000 and patients in categories (mm, mf, fm, ff) = (3500, 3500, 2100, 4900),
with disutilities -2 for each on a waiting list and each vacancy (for comparison
with macro example).
Table 8 Utilities to reflect stronger affection and dislike
Group mm-
p
mf-
p
fm-
p
ff-
p
mm-
w
mf-
w
fm-
w
ff-
w
vacancy
M-
doctor
1 0 0 -2 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
F-doctor -1 0 0 2 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
Utilities to reflect stronger affection among females and stronger dislike of
vacancy and patients on waiting list.
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assigned doctor. One major finding here is that the
number of patients wanting a doctor of the underrepre-
sented gender is less important than the strength of
their preferences as determining factor for the benefit
efficient allocation. Qualitative insights of this kind may
be of value to decision makers at the general policy
level. For applications in the more local setting, in a spe-
cific country or region within a country, we need the
statistics of the current situation with respect to the
availability of doctors and the strength of preferences
among the patients. This may be done by a suitably
designed questionnaire, and may be a research challenge
in itself. Another approach would be to use observed
allocations, in combination with stated preference
for gender, and from this infer the complete utility
structure.
The Norwegian system by which every inhabitant has
the opportunity of having a designated general practi-
tioner was introduced in the year 2001 and is monitored
by the authorities. Detailed information on availability of
doctors and list composition and vacancies are available,
and may serve as a laboratory for both research and
applications. To give an idea of the kind of data avail-
able: At the end of the year 2004 the fraction of doctors
with open lists was about 55%, 44% among female doc-
tors and 59% among males in the country at large, while
the corresponding numbers in the capital Oslo were
76%, 61% and 85%. Such numbers are available also
regionally and locally. Movements over time are notice-
able, and may indicate that the preference for a doctor
of the same gender have increased since the system was
introduced. However, part of this may be due to a ten-
dency for most newborn to be assigned to the doctor of
their mother. This raises an additional challenge, both
for revealing real preferences and interpreting allocation
data. It is possible that the solution to this is to combine
the two approaches mentioned above.
We will here briefly address the so called inverse pro-
blem of inferring the utility structure from an observed
allocation, leaving out the complications mentioned
above. We are now facing a situation where different uti-
lity structures may lead to the same allocation, and con-
sequently a given allocation will not uniquely determine
the utilities. Some extra assumptions have to be imposed
in order to identify the preference structure uniquely. In
technical terms, we have an identification problem,
which was solved theoretically in Ubøe and Lillestøl [16].
Here the general theory is illustrated by data on gender
of patients, preferred gender of doctor and assigned gen-
der of doctor extracted from the official panel survey of
Norwegian living conditions (“Levekårsundersøkelsen
2003”). This work revealed, not surprisingly, a structure
where the felt nuisance of a mismatched male patient
who wants a female doctor was less than the correspond-
ing mismatch for female patients wanting a female doc-
tor. Perhaps more surprisingly, for both male and female
patients, the felt nuisance of getting a female doctor
when wanting a male was considerably higher, and high-
est for female patients. However, the response rate on
these specific questions in the survey were low (a finding
of some interest in itself), and more reliable data on the
issue will be welcomed. This may give the authorities
some clues with respect to “where we are and where we
may be headed”, in the most likely scenario of increasing
fraction of female doctors.
Conclusions
Based on a novel approach to allocations we were able
to gain some insights to the dynamics of assignments
according to gender preferences for doctors in general
practice, in case of gender scarcity to fulfill the prefer-
ences. In particular we got some answers to the ques-
tions asked by the practitioners relating to likely
Table 9 Fraction of female patients among male and
female doctors
% ff vs fm 10-90 20-80 30-70 40-60 50-50
f among M-doctors 0.303 0.273 0.240 0.206 0.180
f among F-doctors 0.763 0.802 0.846 0.890 0.923
Fraction of female patients among male and female doctors for different
fractions of female patients preferences and stronger affection among female
than males (for comparison with macro model)
Table 10 Utility structure to explore the sensitivity to
change
Group mm-p mf-p fm-p ff-p
M-doctor 1 0 0 -x
F-doctor -1 0 0 x
Utility structure to explore the sensitivity to change in female preferences for
female doctor, where x is a positive number, typically greater than one.
Ϭ
Ϭ͘Ϯ
Ϭ͘ϰ
Ϭ͘ϲ
Ϭ͘ϴ
ϭ
Ϭ ϭ Ϯ ϯ ϰ ϱ
x
&ƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ
20%F: f at F
30%F: f at F
40%F: f at F
20%F: f at M
30%F: f at M
40%F: f at M 
Figure 5 Fraction of female patients among female and male
doctors as function of disparate utility parameter. Fraction of
female patients among female doctors (upper bundle of curves)
and male doctors (lower bundle of curves) as function of disparate
utility parameter x for different fractions of female doctors 20%
(solid line), 30% (dashed line) and 40% (dotted line).
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changes when the scarce resource (i.e. female doctors) is
on the rise. The approach is quite general and can be
applied in a variety of contexts involving allocations
according to preferences, with restrictions on fulfillment.
Appendix: The benefit efficient micro model
Assume p patient categories (named i = 1,2,...,p) and q
doctors (named by j = 1,2,...,q) of r different types
(named by k = 1,2,...,r). The situation in the main text,
with patient categories being the gender combined with
the preferred gender of the doctor, corresponds to p = 4
and r = 2. Each doctor has a patient list with a given
number of available entries and in addition a waiting
list. To each doctor we associate 2p + 1 categories, first
the p patient categories for registered patients (named
by i = 1,2,...,p), then the same p categories for the
patients on the waiting list (named in the same order by
i = p+1, p+2,...,2p), and finally the category i = 2p + 1
for registration of possible vacant entries. Let for k =
1,2,...,r
u(i,k) = Utility for patients of type i assigned to a doc-
tor of type k (for i = 1,2,...,p)
u(i,k) = Utility for patients of type i on the waiting list
of a doctor of type k (for i = p + 1,...,2p)
u(i,k) = (Dis)utility per vacant entry of a doctor of type
k (for i = 2p+1)
An assignment of all the patients to doctors and wait-
ing lists, as well as vacancies, is judged by their total uti-
lity obtained by adding utilities over all patients. Let P(i,
j,k) denote the probability of a patient/vacancy of type i
(i = 1,2,...,2p+1) belonging to doctor no. j (j = 1,2,...,q)
who is of type k. The assumption of “efficient system
behaviour” amounts to saying that for two allocations,
the one with the higher total utility is more probable.
From this assumption it follows that the allocation prob-
abilities can be written on the following form, see Ubøe
and Lillestøl [14]:
P(i, j, k) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ai · bj · ec u(i,k)
ai−p · ec u(i,k)
bj · ec u(i,k)
i = 1, 2, ...., p
i = p + 1, p + 2, ...., 2p
i = 2p + 1
where the a’s and b’s are coefficients determined by
the restrictions in the situation, among others the list
length of each doctor, and typically also that it is an
equal number of patients of each gender to be assigned.
As for the gravity model c is the weight put on the dif-
ferences in the assigned utilities. A constant added to all
utility numbers have no effect, since this is absorbed in
the multiplicative constants a and b. If we multiply all
utilities with the same positive number, we get the same
solution, since the c-coefficient becomes rescaled as
well, while the products are the same. Thus c may be
taken as so-called “numeraire”. Note that the obtained
representation is quite different from anything obtained
by expected utility maximization.
Once we have specified c and the utilities u(i,k) we
have an equation system that can be uniquely solved
numerically, for instance by extensions of the Bregman
balancing algorithm, see Bregman [17] and Jørnsten and
Ubøe [13].
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